

KOSOVO - KOSOVA

Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The Peoples' Views from Kosovo and Serbia

EMBARGO TILL 20 OCTOBER 11.00 AM

Dr. Colin Irwin
Institute of Governance
Queen's University Belfast
Belfast, Northern Ireland, BT7 1NN
Email: c.irwin@qub.ac.uk
Web site: www.peacepolls.org

About the Poll

This survey of public opinion was undertaken to find out what the people of Kosovo and Serbia believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region. The research was carried out by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe from Thessaloniki in Greece, KosovaLive in Pristina and Beta Media Center in Belgrade with advice from Dr. Colin Irwin from the Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Dr. Irwin collected the questions for the survey through extensive interviews (with Serbs and Albanians) in Kosovo and Serbia during May and June 2005. The questionnaire was then administered to approximately 1200 people from Kosovo and 1200 people from Serbia to complete representative samples in terms of age, gender, social class, political and ethnic affiliation and geographical area for a total of approximately 2400 interviews. To make sure all groups were brought into this programme of research these interviews included special 'booster' samples of Serbs in Kosovo enclaves and Serb IDPs in Serbia. The interviews for the poll were conducted between August 26th and September 2nd 2005. In Serbia the fieldwork was carried out by Strategic Marketing Research of Belgrade and in Kosovo by Strategic Puls Research of Tirana, Albania.

The results are being made available for public access on the internet, in the local newspapers and in reports that will be given to all the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia as well as all the major international organisations working in the region. Topics covered include the problems faced by the people, their politicians and the international community in the region, what will happen if these problems are not properly addressed and a range of solutions to deal with these problems.

Introduction

Social and political conflicts are a major source of instability in the world today. They affect not just the countries in which they occur, but very often engulf their neighbors and have a potential to throw entire regions into turmoil. Even if settlements are reached they often remain unstable resulting in a return to violence or necessitating ongoing intervention by the international community. Tragically Kosovo may be such a case. But the potential for the success of peace processes can be greatly increased when all sections of society are provided with opportunities to become active partners in their own peace process. Imposed solutions and deals done 'behind closed doors' (witness Dayton or the Ohrid Interim Agreement) and backed up with international pressure and force may bring temporary relief to apparently intractable problems. But 'home grown' solutions that have the widest possible support amongst the various elements that make up a society are essential for progress towards long-term stability and peace.

In the modern political world of international norms, globalisation, mass media and an increasingly well-informed electorate, solutions to political, economic and social problems require a discourse and decision-making process that engages with the leadership, civil society and population at large. Achieving such a process in divided societies is problematic and requires every possible assistance and support. However, by pro-actively testing public opinion as part of the search for compromise and common ground, it is possible for negotiators to build consensus and strengthen the potential for political stability, economic prosperity and the degree of social cohesion necessary to sustain them.

To this end, nine surveys of public opinion were conducted in support of the Northern Ireland peace process between April 1996 and February 2003. In so far as it was possible the parties were given ‘ownership’ of the research so that they would take the results seriously. Each party to the negotiations nominated a member of their team to work with the facilitator on the polls. Questions were designed to test party policies as a series of options or preferences from across the social and political spectrum. The moderating voice of ‘the silent majority’ was thus given expression while extremist positions were demonstrated to be marginal with little cross community support. All questions, options and preferences had to be agreed as not being partisan or misleading. From the drafting of these questions to sample design, ethics, timing and publication, the programme of research was decided by all the parties and they were encouraged to take the work in any direction that they believed would be helpful to the peace process.

The focus of the research was on problems, solutions and policies for conflict resolution as opposed to inter-community attitudes and values. Personality and ‘popularity contest’ questions were avoided unless it was clear that running such a question would help to solve a problem. Questions were ‘pitched’ at what most people could understand most of the time NOT at the lowest common denominator. All relevant issues were covered and NO irrelevant issues. All the results were also made publicly available effectively giving the wider community a ‘seat at the negotiating table’ and exposing the research to the highest standards of peer review and public scrutiny. There was no ‘cherry picking’ of the results. Everyone had to deal with all the issues that were raised as part of what became a ‘pre-negotiation problem solving exercise’.

This inter-track activity, that extended across the political spectrum to all the major parties, civil society and the public at large helped to build a consensus for the Belfast Agreement that lead to a successful referendum and subsequent period of increasing stability and peace. In an effort to internationalize this work a book ‘The People’s Peace Process in Northern Ireland’ was published by Palgrave/MacMillan; numerous papers and reports have also been made available on the project website at peacepolls.org; a poll was completed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2002, Bosnia Herzegovina in 2004 and Alexandros Lordos initiated a similar programme of research in Cyprus in 2004 and 2005. The Northern Ireland methods can and have been applied successfully elsewhere.

The poll reviewed in this report is a first attempt to replicate these methods in Kosovo and Serbia. Uniquely the same set of questions has been asked in both societies and representatives of these different communities wrote them. Politicians, journalists, academics, civil servants and business people all made a contribution to drafting the questions and all sections of the two populations had an opportunity to answer them. It is not up to me to say if this or that solution is the best solution to deal with the problems that must be faced by the people of Kosovo and Serbia or even if this or that question is the right question to be asked. It is up to the people of Kosovo and Serbia and their elected representatives to do this. This report contains a wealth of interesting responses to the questions that the people of Kosovo and Serbia wanted answers to. It provides a basis for much rich and fruitful discussion for the people, their elected representatives and the negotiating teams who must now shoulder the responsibility of their respective communities’ future security and prosperity. In this regard I hope they will find this report of value and I wish them every success in their endeavours.

PART 1: THE PROBLEMS

1. The range of problems: The question

Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate which ones you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance' or 'Of No Significance' at all.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

From a list of 31 items the top five priorities for Kosovo Albanians are Kosovo's final status at 87% very significant followed by unemployment at 85%, the weak economy at 75%, corruption at 70% and education standards also at 70%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Kosovo's final status	87%
2	Unemployment in Kosovo	85%
3	The weak economy of Kosovo	75%
4	Corruption in Kosovo	70%
5	Kosovo education standards	70%

In polls run by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others final status and unemployment have also come out as the top priorities for Kosovo Albanians. This result is consistent with those results.

Serbian priorities

For Serbs living in Kosovo the top priority is the power supply at 78% very significant. But for Serbs living in Serbia it is security at 83% very significant and for Serb IDPs in Serbia it is missing persons and the return process for IDPs both at 84%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Kosovo power supply	78%	1	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%	1	Missing persons	84%
2	Public and personal security in Kosovo	74%	2	Missing persons	76%	2	Return process of IDPs/refugees	84%
3	Return process of IDPs/refugees	72%	3	Organised crime in Kosovo	72%	3	Public and personal security in Kosovo	83%
4	Kosovo's final status	65%	4	Kosovo's final status	72%	4	The rights of victims	82%
5	Missing persons	62%	5	Return process of IDPs/refugees	71%	5	Kosovo's final status	79%

These results are also consistent with similar polls run in Kosovo which place personal security at the top of the Kosovo Serb list. But it is only number 2 here behind power supply which does not even get into the top five for Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs. For all Serbs the other top items are the rights of victims, Kosovo's final status and organised crime.

Some points of disagreement

49% of Kosovo Albanians consider the role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo to be of no significance while only 1% of Kosovo Serbs share this view. Conversely 19% of Kosovo Serbs consider the actions of the Kosovo government to be of no significance while only 1% of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Acknowledging and accepting the role of both the governments in Pristina and Belgrade as having a legitimate role in the affairs and future of the peoples of Kosovo seems to be problematic for a significant percentage of both communities in Kosovo.

Of no significance	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo	49%	2%	4%	4%
The actions of the Kosovo government	1%	19%	7%	6%

Some points of agreement

Public and personal security came in at number 8 on the list of 31 items for Kosovo Albanians (65% very significant). So they share this concern with Serbs although it is not such a big problem for them. Power supply came in at 6 (69% very significant). Serbs are also concerned about the final status of Kosovo being 4th or 5th on their lists of priorities - and so on and so on. The point to be made here is that although everyone's order of priorities is different Albanians and Serbs seem to share, or understand or at the very least acknowledge each other's priorities. In all of this there is clearly a shared basis for discussion and points of negotiation. Reaching an agreement, however, may be quite another matter.

The other important conclusion to take away from this analysis is that nearly all of the 31 items in this list are recognised as being problems by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike. Very few items are listed as being of no significance by one community or the other. But this list of items is very broad indeed ranging from security to sports facilities. With a tighter focus on the central points of disagreement between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs it may not be possible to sustain this degree of apparent consensus.

2. Kosovo's final status: The question

Now with regards to Kosovo's Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

Kosovo Albanian priorities

Unfortunately the sense of common understanding for the general problems that the people of Kosovo and Serbia have to deal with, illustrated in question 1, does break down when dealing with the sensitive topic of the final status of Kosovo here in question 2. From a list of 42 items Kosovo Albanian priorities start with the failure to develop the Kosovo economy before final status is agreed at 46% very significant followed by keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war at 43%.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	46%
2	Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	43%
3	If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	42%
4	Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	32%
5	Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	30%

Serbian priorities

For Serbs in Serbia and Serb IDPs the top concern is that Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs at 74% and 93% very significant respectively. This item comes in 5th on the list for Serbs living in Kosovo at 78% very significant. Their top item is that an independent Kosovo will be less secure at 80% very significant. For Serbs in Serbia and Serb IDPs this item is second on their lists. Understandably Serb IDPs believe UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs at 80% very significant (5th on their list).

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	80%	1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	74%	1	Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs	93%
2	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	79%	2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	73%	2	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	88%
3	An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	79%	3	If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel safe	73%	3	The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	83%
4	An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	79%	4	Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	71%	4	Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs	81%
5	Kosovo independence will	78%	5	An independent Kosovo will	70%	5	UNMIK is not doing enough to	80%

	lead to an exodus of Serbs		be less secure for everyone		work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs	
--	----------------------------	--	-----------------------------	--	-----------------------------------------	--

Already a bit of a pattern seems to be emerging here where Serbs in Kosovo are perhaps a little less alarmed by matters of concern than their ‘brothers and sisters’ in Serbia and the Serbia IDPs are most concerned of all.

Some points of disagreement

If the ‘not even true’ responses to the questions are examined it is possible to find out what can best be called a ‘credibility gap’ is between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. For example the suggestion that Kosovo independence will result in more violence is not considered true by 88% of Kosovo Albanians while only about 1% of Serbs share this view. Similarly 65% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe the statement that the Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs while almost no Serbs at all share this sceptical opinion.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Kosovo independence will result in more violence	88%	1%	2%	0%
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state	85%	2%	2%	1%
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone	80%	3%	2%	2%
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs	75%	3%	2%	1%
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue	73%	16%	33%	23%
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs	65%	0%	0%	1%
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands	6%	50%	27%	41%
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points	3%	41%	21%	13%
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war	11%	38%	39%	51%
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue	8%	34%	27%	19%
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees	12%	26%	18%	9%

‘It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands’ is only considered not true by 6% of Kosovo Albanians while 50% of Kosovo Serbs do not believe this followed by 41% for Serb IDPs and 27% for Serbs living in Serbia. The credibility gap is not only between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs but also between Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia Serb IDPs. Interestingly keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war was number 2 on the Kosovo Albanian list at 43% very significant but 11% also believe this statement not to be true. Opinion on this issue seems to be some what split.

Some points of agreement

Conversely, when both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree with regards to the basic truth of a statement then a point of some agreement may have been achieved even if they do rate the issue at hand as being more or less significant. Everyone seems to believe, for example, that procedures for negotiations have not been decided and that there is a lack of a political role for Kosovo Serbs in negotiations. Providing Kosovo Serbs with such a role seems to be a problem that everyone would like to see resolved.

Not even true	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed	2%	4%	2%	22%
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided	0%	6%	2%	1%
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations	3%	4%	1%	1%
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia	2%	5%	6%	6%
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable	7%	3%	2%	1%
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo	5%	7%	10%	6%
International community distracted by Iraq	3%	15%	10%	7%
The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and Albanians	17%	3%	1%	0%
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage	15%	5%	8%	3%
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians	19%	4%	2%	1%

3. Serb and Albanian relations: The question

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be 'Very Significant', 'Significant', 'Of Some Significance', 'Of Little Significance', 'Of No Significance' at all or 'Not Even True'

Kosovo Albanian priorities

With regards to relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, from a list of 48 items the most significant problem for Kosovo Albanians is not knowing the fate of lost persons at 73% very significant followed by discrimination against Albanians in the 90s at 58%. Unfortunately 52% of Kosovo Serbs, 36% of Serbia Serbs and 44% of Serb IDPs do not even believe this discrimination to be true. Failure to prosecute war criminals comes in third at 41% very significant for Kosovo Albanians followed by the legacy of so many killings 4th at 38% and KLA officers in the police 5th at 37% very significant. As would be expected and noted below this policing issue is also a problem for Serbs.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	73%
2	Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s	58%
3	Failure to prosecute war criminals	41%
4	The legacy of so many killings	38%
5	KLA officers in the police	37%

Serbian priorities

For all Serbs, in Kosovo and Serbia, the most pressing problem is Albanians wanting a greater Albania at 75% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 74% for Serbia Serbs and 79% for Serb IDPs. But 14% of Kosovo Albanians also think this is a very significant problem and 23% do not even think this is true. This issue gets visited again in the constitutional questions at the end of this report. KLA officers in the police is a matter of considerable concern for Kosovo Serbs at 74% very significant and 77% for Serb IDPs. But again 37% of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Perhaps something can be done about this.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Albanians want a greater Albania	75%	1	Albanians want a greater Albania	74%	1	Albanians want a greater Albania	79%
2	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	75%	2	The legacy of so many killings	73%	2	KLA officers in the police	77%
3	KLA officers in the police	74%	3	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	69%	3	Apologies without security will not help	73%
4	KLA officers in government	71%	4	Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	61%	4	Albanian provocations	72%
5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	67%	5	Not knowing the fate of lost persons	59%	5	Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence	72%

Kosovo Albanians not being prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence comes in 5th at 67% for Kosovo Serbs, 3rd at 69% for Serbs in Serbia and 5th again at 72% for Serb IDPs. Unfortunately 51% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe this to be true. There is a serious credibility gap here that needs attention.

Some points of disagreement

Eighty percent of Kosovo Albanians do not believe they are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade. Only 5% of Kosovo Serbs, 4% of Serbia Serbs and 2% of Serb IDPs share this view.

Similarly 66% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe in an Albanian culture of violence and revenge and only between 3% and 6% of Serbs share this view. On the other hand 61% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs and 51% of Serb IDPs do not believe in a Serb culture of violence and dominance. This time 15% of Kosovo Albanians agree with them, but most do not. However, beyond this particular credibility gap there are some grounds for hope. Both Kosovo Albanians (56%) and Serbs (between 37% and 42%) do not believe all the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence.

	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Not even true				
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade	80%	5%	4%	2%
Albanian culture of violence and revenge	66%	3%	5%	6%
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate	66%	42%	30%	49%
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop talking to Belgrade	58%	2%	2%	0%
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence	56%	42%	37%	40%
Serbs exaggerate the security problem	6%	68%	67%	74%
Serb culture of violence and dominance	15%	62%	46%	51%
Serb provocations	9%	61%	33%	59%
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo	5%	59%	38%	40%
Serbs want a greater Serbia	2%	56%	52%	65%

In contrast to the point about a greater Albania made earlier it should be noted that 56% of Kosovo Serbs, 52% of Serbia Serbs and 65% of Serb IDPs do not believe Serbs want a greater Serbia. Unfortunately only 2% of Kosovo Albanians share this view so this particular credibility gap seems to be quite mutual.

Some points of agreement

There are some significant points of agreement to be taken from this analysis. Firstly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree that not knowing the fate of lost persons and the legacy of so many killings are significant problems. Almost no ones believes these problems are not true. Some what surprisingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs also believe KLA officers in the police and government is also a problem. Hardly anyone thinks this is not true although, for example, while 71% of Kosovo Serbs think this problem is very significant only between 28% and 37% of Kosovo Albanians feel this strongly about this issue. But there is clearly sufficient common ground here to build on. There is also much agreement about the problems of inflammatory language in the media, the influence of war criminals in politics and a general lack of trust between Serbs and Albanians. But these problems are not unique to Kosovo and Serbia alone, the different ethnic groups and nationalities of Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia have to struggle with these same difficulties.

	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Not even true				
Not knowing the fate of lost persons	0%	0%	2%	0%
The legacy of so many killings	2%	0%	0%	0%
KLA officers in the police	3%	1%	1%	1%
KLA officers in government	1%	5%	1%	0%
Inflammatory language from politicians	5%	3%	2%	5%
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians	3%	6%	1%	1%
Inflammatory language from the media	7%	4%	2%	5%
Influence of war criminals in politics	3%	8%	2%	1%
Failure to prosecute war criminals	1%	12%	4%	17%
Serb desire to return to pre-war status	5%	7%	5%	11%

4. Security: The question

Now with regards to security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be ‘Very Significant’, ‘Significant’, ‘Of Some Significance’, ‘Of Little Significance’, ‘Of No Significance’ at all or ‘Not Even True’

Kosovo Albanian priorities

The security list of problems contains 29 items. The weak justice system comes in at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list at 49% very significant. This is followed by organised political crime at 48%, Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica and a lack of trust in the justice system both at 46% and then 5th, at 43% very significant, slow working of the justice system. Seventy nine percent of Serb IDPs share this concern. However 89% of Kosovo Serbs also consider Serbs being afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina to be very significant. Fear, in these regards, seems to be quite mutual.

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Weak justice system	49%
2	Organised political crime	48%
3	Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	46%
4	Lack of trust in the justice system	46%
5	Slow working of the justice system	43%

Serbian priorities

The most important security concern for Serbs is that people do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo at 84% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 91% for Serbia Serbs and 94% for Serb IDPs. This is followed by isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes for Kosovo Serbs at 72%, Serbia Serbs 83% and Serb IDPs 76%. After this comes no unconditional support from the Albanian political leadership to improve security at 66% for Kosovo Serbs, 71% for Serbia Serbs and 82% for Serb IDPs. Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) comes in 5th on the Kosovo Serb (65%) and Serbia Serb (71%) lists but, perhaps understandably Serb IDPs put UNMIK do not provide effective security in their top five concerns at 82% very significant.

Very Significant - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	89%	1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	91%	1	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	94%
2	People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	84%	2	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	83%	2	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	82%
3	Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	72%	3	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	71%	3	Organised political crime	82%
4	No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	66%	4	Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	71%	4	UNMIK do not provide effective security	82%
5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	65%	5	Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	71%	5	Slow working of the justice system	79%

Some points of disagreement

For Serbs the problem of security is their biggest problem. It is therefore a matter of some concern that Kosovo Albanians do not seem to believe how seriously Serbs take this issue. Sixty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians do not consider the proposition that people do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo to be true. They also do not believe the Kosovo Albanian political leadership are failing to give unconditional support to the improvement of security (67% not even true) and that isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes (65% not even true). But then, somewhat similarly, 60% of Kosovo Serbs (45% Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads. Only 13% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. And then again 60% of Kosovo Serbs (55% Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Albanians fear an external military threat. This time only 22% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. Finally, in this list there is also the Pristina/Mitrovica credibility gap mentioned earlier where neither group believe the other when they say they are afraid to speak their own language in the others 'territory'.

	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Not even true				
People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo	69%	0%	0%	1%
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina	68%	0%	2%	0%
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security	67%	3%	0%	1%
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes	65%	7%	0%	0%
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats	65%	5%	3%	3%
Not enough minorities in government posts	20%	1%	1%	0%
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads	13%	60%	45%	51%
Albanian fear from external military threat	22%	60%	55%	51%
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice	4%	45%	20%	31%
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica	4%	44%	38%	50%
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	4%	13%	2%	6%

With regards to clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo the results for both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are mixed. Some think this is a problem and some do not, while a few do not believe it to be true. So this item ended up in both this list and the one below.

Some points of agreement

With regards to the weak justice system, slow working of the justice system and lack of trust in the justice system everyone seems to think there is plenty of room for improvement and very few people, from both communities, do not consider these problems to be true. Organised political crime is also a common problem for everyone as well as a lack of local police whose ethnic composition reflects the local populations. Even 43% of Kosovo Albanians believe the problem of Kosovo Serbs not being able to trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to be very significant or significant. Clearly movement can be made on all these issues with a minimum of political leadership.

	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Not even true				
Weak justice system	2%	0%	1%	0%
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population	4%	3%	1%	4%
Slow working of the justice system	5%	2%	0%	1%
Lack of trust in the justice system	2%	5%	0%	0%
Organised political crime	2%	5%	0%	1%
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)	9%	7%	1%	1%
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia and Serbian)	4%	13%	2%	6%
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)	10%	12%	1%	1%
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally	16%	9%	6%	3%

Most Serbs and Kosovo Albanians agree that they have opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) but this can hardly be counted as real progress. However, there does seem to be general support for the prosecution of war criminals from both communities.

5. A future without agreement: The question

And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be 'Very probable', 'Probable', 'Not sure' about, 'Improbable' or 'Very improbable'.

Kosovo Albanian possible futures

Relatively speaking Kosovo Albanians are not nearly so worried about the future as Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia IDPs. If the problems reviewed in questions 1 to 4 do not get properly addressed then

only 31% of Kosovo Albanians believe this will very probably lead to social unrest and only 17% believe this will very probably lead to the isolation of Kosovo and Serbia.

Very Probable - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Social unrest	31%
2	Increased criminalisation	29%
3	Lack of investment	28%
4	Increased emigration	28%
5	Renewed violent conflict	26%
6	Decrease in international assistance	24%
7	Increased international military presence	24%
8	Escalation of ethnic tensions	20%
9	Increased political instability	19%
10	Increased regional instability	18%
11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	17%

Serbian possible futures

All the groups of Serbs interviewed for this poll believed the most likely outcome of not adequately dealing with these problems will very probably lead to increased criminalisation at 55% for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 70% for Serb IDPs. However, like their Albanian counterparts, they also believe the least likely outcome of such a failure would be the isolation of Kosovo and Serbia. Clearly very few people in Kosovo or Serbia believe the international community is about to ‘turn their back’ on them, whatever happens.

Very Probable - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Increased criminalisation	55%	1	Increased criminalisation	65%	1	Increased criminalisation	70%
2	Increased emigration	47%	2	Increased political instability	57%	2	Renewed violent conflict	62%
3	Increased regional instability	47%	3	Escalation of ethnic tensions	54%	3	Increased political instability	61%
4	Increased political instability	42%	4	Social unrest	53%	4	Escalation of ethnic tensions	59%
5	Renewed violent conflict	41%	5	Increased emigration	51%	5	Social unrest	56%
6	Escalation of ethnic tensions	40%	6	Increased regional instability	51%	6	Increased regional instability	51%
7	Decrease in international assistance	34%	7	Renewed violent conflict	51%	7	Increased emigration	49%
8	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	33%	8	Lack of investment	41%	8	Increased international military presence	47%
9	Lack of investment	32%	9	Increased international military presence	41%	9	Decrease in international assistance	45%
10	Social unrest	30%	10	Decrease in international assistance	39%	10	Lack of investment	40%
11	Increased international military presence	28%	11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	32%	11	Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia	30%

PART 2: THE SOLUTIONS

6. Serb and Albanian relations: The question

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

When it comes to the solutions to the problems reviewed in the first part of this report Kosovo Albanians put Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo at the top of their list at 46% essential from a total of 33 possible options. This is followed by Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals and Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade both at 28% essential. Then comes public

apologies from Serbs for past wrongs at 25% and student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US at 21% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	46%
2	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	28%
3	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	28%
4	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	25%
5	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	21%

Serbian priorities

The emphasis for Kosovo Serbs, with regards to improving Kosovo Albanian/Serb relations, is on the people of Kosovo doing more to make Kosovo Serbs welcome at 77% essential, the city of Pristina doing more at 70% and the Kosovo government doing more at 61%. Kosovo Serbs would also like a special status for Serb religious sites at 70% essential and Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo at 66% essential. Serbia Serbs agree with all of this but they also think Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions at 63% essential. Again Serb IDPs share the same views but they also emphasise an obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs at 65% essential and to encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions at 64% essential. Clearly improved community relations and with it real political progress will be very much dependent on making Serbs feel truly welcome in Kosovo.

Essential - Kosovo Serb		Serbia Serb		Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	77%	1	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	71%	1
2	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	70%	2	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	67%	2
3	Special status for Serb religious sites	70%	3	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	63%	3
4	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	66%	4	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	63%	4
5	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	61%	5	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	63%	5

Points of agreement and disagreement

It is much easier to identify the options that are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs using the style of question employed in section 2. In table 6 below all 33 suggestions for improving community relations have been listed in their order of being ‘unacceptable’ for Kosovo Albanians from a low of only 3% unacceptable for student exchange programmes to a high of 80% unacceptable for Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo. Against these values for Kosovo Albanians the levels of ‘unacceptable’ for the three groups of Serbs sampled in these polls have been added in along side each option. For student exchange it is only 8% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 2% for Serbia Serbs and 3% for Serb IDPs. This is clearly a popular option and should be implemented. However, directly below this option is Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade. Most Kosovo Albanians think this is a good idea with only 6% opposed to it as unacceptable. Nineteen percent of Serbia Serbs find this suggestion unacceptable as do 29% of Kosovo Serbs, but 40% of Serb IDPs find it unacceptable. This idea concerns Serb IDPs very much. They clearly rely on the support of Belgrade.

I have marked up all the items where one community or the other finds a suggested policy more than 40% unacceptable as being problematic to implement by shading them ‘grey’. The decision to ‘make this cut’ at 40% is a little arbitrary and almost any value could be used. But experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere suggests that if items get to be much more than 40 to 50 percent unacceptable then they may have to be ‘horse traded’ for something the other community want in negotiations or might have to be ‘sweetened’ in some way, perhaps with some ‘concessions’ or ‘compensation’ from one or another source

as part of an overall settlement or ‘package’. In Northern Ireland that source was usually the British Government.

Some of the items in this list are not acceptable to either community. Item 30 for example. No one seems to think mixed schools are a very good idea except of Serbia Serbs who only oppose this suggestion at a level of 17% unacceptable (44% for Kosovo Albanians, 60% for Kosovo Serbs and 45% for Serb IDPs). However, at least half of the items on this list are acceptable or at least tolerable and could be implemented with a little political leadership and cooperation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. I will not go through the list here. The reader can do that and draw their own conclusions.

Table 6. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent ‘Unacceptable’				
1	Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US	3%	8%	2%	3%
2	Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade	6%	29%	19%	40%
3	Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade	10%	7%	0%	1%
4	Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	11%	0%	0%	0%
5	Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs	11%	2%	1%	1%
6	Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals	11%	17%	11%	12%
7	Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations	12%	8%	2%	7%
8	Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church	13%	7%	6%	7%
9	Government support for bilingual media	14%	6%	4%	7%
10	Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs	15%	20%	26%	48%
11	Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo	16%	36%	22%	25%
12	Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	17%	0%	0%	1%
13	Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools	17%	33%	5%	21%
14	Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions	18%	4%	2%	3%
15	Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo	18%	73%	65%	66%
16	Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia	19%	21%	28%	28%
17	Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals	19%	6%	7%	10%
18	The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome	20%	0%	1%	3%
19	Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides	21%	6%	4%	1%
20	Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides	27%	6%	6%	16%
21	Decentralisation at the municipal level	27%	9%	3%	8%
22	The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome	27%	1%	1%	3%
23	An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia	28%	3%	0%	0%
24	Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo	30%	3%	1%	0%
25	Each side should give up their maximum demands	38%	2%	3%	3%
26	Offer higher education in both languages	42%	19%	5%	7%
27	Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs	43%	1%	3%	1%
28	Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions	44%	25%	1%	11%
29	Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools	44%	18%	6%	10%
30	Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs	47%	60%	17%	45%
31	Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs	49%	11%	9%	15%
32	Special status for Serb religious sites	53%	2%	1%	0%
33	Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo	80%	4%	3%	5%

7. Security: The question

With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

The proposal that Mitrovica should become a unified city comes in at the top of the list of Kosovo Albanian priorities for security at 83% essential. Kosovo Albanians also place a great deal of importance

on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal at 67% essential, establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior at 63% and better training for the police and one legal government both at 59% essential.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Mitrovica should become a unified city	83%
2	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	67%
3	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	63%
4	Better training for the police	59%
5	One legal government	59%

Serbian priorities

The number one security priority for Kosovo Serbs is to have Serb police guard monasteries in Kosovo at 67% essential. All Serbs believe the security forces should be made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups at 66% essential for Kosovo Serbs, 68% for Serbia Serbs and 75% for Serb IDPs. Serb IDPs place the need for a special property court to deal with property disputes at the top of their list at 82% essential. This item is also in the ‘top five’ for Kosovo Serbs at 47% essential. Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime and all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties also feature in the ‘top five’ of Kosovo Serb, Serbia Serb and Serb IDPs lists. However Kosovo Serbs also place North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities third in their list at 50% essential. The emphasis in all of this seems to be the application of the rule of law both in Kosovo and throughout the region and an accountable police service.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	67%	1	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	68%	1	Special property court to deal with property disputes	82%
2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	66%	2	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	63%	2	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	75%
3	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	51%	3	More efficient and effective judicial system	63%	3	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	72%
4	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	50%	4	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	62%	4	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	67%
5	Special property court to deal with property disputes	47%	5	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	59%	5	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	66%

Points of agreement and disagreement

The points of agreement and disagreement have been analysed and identified in the same way as previously done in question 6. Those items, from a list of 32, which Serbs or Kosovo Albanians identify as being more than 40% unacceptable have been highlighted in grey in table 7 below.

At the present time both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians do not trust each other to take care of security and justice. Sixty five percent of Kosovo Serbs and 49% of Serb IDPs do not want Kosovo to establish their own Ministry of the Interior or their own war crimes court at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 53% unacceptable for Serbia Serbs and 55% unacceptable for Serb IDPs. Similarly 70% of Kosovo Albanians do not want Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo. But both communities do want a whole range of reforms that will make the criminal justice system fairer, more efficient and accountable. Interestingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs do not want the establishment of separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps (59% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 44% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 33% for Serbia Serbs and 34% for Serb IDPs). However, most importantly, no one is opposed to the idea that all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties. The percentage unacceptable for this item was Kosovo Albanian 1%, Kosovo Serb 0%, Serbia Serb 0% and

Serb IDPs 0%. Clearly such prosecutions and the reform of the criminal justice system are the first steps that need to be taken to the establishment of real security for all.

Having joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo may be a workable compromise on this issue as the level of opposition seems to be balanced at 33% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 29% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs. But there is no consensus on the future of Mitrovica, 94% of Kosovo Albanians are opposed to separate municipalities as unacceptable while 64% of Kosovo Serbs, 11% of Serbia Serbs and 42% of Serb IDPs are opposed to a unified municipality as unacceptable. Perhaps questions of security will have to be satisfactorily dealt with before this kind of problem can be addressed.

Table 7. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 7 – With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’. Percent ‘Unacceptable’	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
1	Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior	0%	65%	24%	49%
2	Better training for the police	0%	0%	1%	17%
3	Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers	0%	7%	3%	20%
4	Special property court to deal with property disputes	0%	0%	0%	1%
5	Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime	0%	1%	0%	3%
6	Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority	0%	14%	3%	9%
7	Kosovo should have its own war crimes court	0%	67%	53%	55%
8	Parallel reform of police with local government reform	1%	9%	2%	24%
9	All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties	1%	0%	0%	0%
10	More efficient and effective judicial system	1%	3%	0%	0%
11	Properly paid safe judges	1%	3%	0%	5%
12	Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation	1%	4%	3%	8%
13	Mitrovica should become a unified city	1%	64%	11%	42%
14	Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal	1%	14%	13%	8%
15	Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups	2%	2%	0%	2%
16	Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say	2%	4%	0%	0%
17	To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement	3%	51%	14%	30%
18	Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo	4%	23%	5%	24%
19	The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities	4%	28%	6%	15%
20	Local courts initially supervised by the international community	5%	8%	8%	9%
21	One legal government	5%	21%	4%	6%
22	One unified judicial system	8%	16%	3%	5%
23	Decommissioning of privately held weapons	10%	15%	3%	7%
24	Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation	10%	13%	5%	9%
25	Demilitarisation of border regions	14%	35%	24%	20%
26	KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities	28%	26%	5%	16%
27	Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	33%	29%	2%	25%
28	Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps	59%	44%	33%	34%
29	Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo	70%	2%	3%	6%
30	Two official languages	77%	22%	21%	7%
31	One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina	78%	18%	19%	39%
32	North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities	94%	14%	23%	11%

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo: The Question

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

Fifty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians consider it essential that Belgrade agree final status. They would also like the US to be more pro-active at 57% essential, for the international community to agree final status (56% essential), for there to be a referendum in Kosovo on final status (53% essential) and for talks

in both the US and EU (49% essential). So Kosovo Albanian priorities seem to emphasise the involvement of the international community in both negotiations and the recognition of final status and, naturally, they would like a referendum.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Belgrade will have to agree final status	59%
2	The US should be more pro-active	57%
3	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	56%
4	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	53%
5	Talks in the US and EU	49%

Serbian priorities

Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs both want the international community to involve Belgrade more at 70% and 72% essential respectively. Serbia Serbs also take the view that Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs (73% essential) and that Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table (71% essential). Naturally Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs agree. Both Serbia Serbs (65% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (58% essential) put the requirement that the international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background in their top five priorities and ‘open talks’ are in the top five for both Serb IDPs (79% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (60% essential). However Kosovo Serbs, perhaps understandably, also put meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations as their third priority at 58% essential. Although the priorities of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are a little different these points of negotiation procedure or what are sometimes referred to as ‘shape of the table’ questions are not necessarily mutually exclusive so most of them can be given the attention of Pristina, Belgrade and the international community.

Essential - Kosovo Serb			Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	International community should involve Belgrade more	70%	1	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	73%	1	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	80%
2	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	61%	2	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	71%	2	Open talks	79%
3	Open talks	60%	3	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	69%	3	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	76%
4	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	58%	4	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	65%	4	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	75%
5	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	58%	5	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	63%	5	International community should involve Belgrade more	72%

Points of agreement and disagreement

As can easily be seen from the lack of grey in table 8 below most of the suggestions for negotiations are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike. However there are a few notable exceptions. There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status is not supported by 84% of Kosovo Serbs as unacceptable, 63% of Serbs as unacceptable and 52% of Serb IDPs as unacceptable. Conversely there should be a referendum in Serbia on final status is not supported by 66% of Kosovo Albanians as unacceptable.

Although all Serbs want Kosovo Serbs to be in negotiations Kosovo Serbs have strong reservations about elections in this regard. Forty percent of Kosovo Serbs consider the idea that Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations to be unacceptable. One way or another a resolution to this problem

is going to have to be found, as everyone seems to agree that Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade, at only 3% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 3% unacceptable for Serbia Serbs and 9% unacceptable for Serb IDPs.

Kosovo Serbs do not want the international community to impose a settlement if negotiations fail (46% unacceptable) and 54% of Kosovo Albanians do not want the Serbian Orthodox Church to have a role in negotiations. But no one wants secret talks at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 71% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs and 72% unacceptable for both Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs.

Table 8. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 8 – With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’.	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
	Percent ‘Unacceptable’				
1	An open forum for political parties and experts	0%	4%	2%	18%
2	Talks in the US and EU	0%	36%	32%	25%
3	The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status	0%	12%	4%	12%
4	The EU should be more pro-active	0%	8%	5%	11%
5	The US should be more pro-active	0%	32%	28%	15%
6	The Contact Group should have one position	1%	4%	3%	1%
7	Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs	1%	7%	5%	15%
8	Belgrade will have to agree final status	1%	25%	7%	22%
9	Open talks	2%	2%	1%	0%
10	Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians’	2%	6%	5%	2%
11	Fixed time table for negotiations	2%	4%	1%	7%
12	Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade	3%	2%	3%	9%
13	The EU and US should have one position	3%	9%	7%	6%
14	Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations	4%	40%	23%	34%
15	Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties	4%	4%	10%	10%
16	Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary	4%	13%	7%	10%
17	There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status	5%	84%	63%	52%
18	The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their political background	11%	1%	1%	0%
19	Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians	12%	3%	8%	10%
20	Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side	14%	14%	5%	3%
21	Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations	15%	1%	5%	6%
22	International penalties for not negotiating	15%	11%	8%	10%
23	Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table	17%	8%	0%	0%
24	International community should involve Belgrade more	17%	0%	2%	8%
25	If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should make the agreement	17%	46%	36%	28%
26	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs	19%	4%	1%	0%
27	Talks in Kosovo and Serbia	20%	7%	1%	1%
28	Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status	21%	21%	3%	0%
29	Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict	22%	4%	5%	4%
30	Belgrade’s priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo	23%	17%	3%	1%
31	Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs	23%	4%	0%	0%
32	Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels	24%	19%	9%	9%
33	Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs	27%	1%	0%	0%
34	Negotiations should be given plenty of time	31%	6%	9%	4%
35	Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions	32%	5%	1%	0%
36	Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations	34%	6%	3%	17%
37	New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations	36%	23%	8%	15%
38	Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary	39%	16%	14%	4%
39	The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations	54%	13%	8%	3%
40	There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status	66%	17%	28%	18%
41	Secret talks	67%	71%	72%	72%

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo: The Question

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Kosovo Albanian priorities

No one will be at all surprised to find full independence at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list of 49 different principles for the final status of Kosovo at 81% essential. Behind this come some of the major characteristics of independence. Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army at 73% essential, be a member of the UN at 67% essential and make its own foreign policy at 60% essential. Fifth on the Kosovo Albanian list is NATO should stay as long as is needed at 57% essential. Kosovo Albanians want independence but like Kosovo Serbs they also want security and in this they welcome the assistance and support of the international community.

Essential - Kosovo Albanian		
1	Full independence	81%
2	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	73%
3	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	67%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	60%
5	NATO should stay as long as is needed	57%

Serbian priorities

Kosovo can not leave Serbia is at the top of all three Serb lists at 69% essential for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 73% for Serb IDPs. And second on the list for Serbia Serbs at 58% and Serb IDPs at 59% is Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship. This item is third on the Kosovo Serb list at 56% essential after meeting Standards before agreeing final status at 58%. After that various solutions that respect present boarders and international law are most important and Serb IDPs do not want full independence at 39% essential. Fifth on the Serbia Serb list at 43% essential is the suggestion that Albanians should pay the financial costs of separating from Serbia.

Essential - Kosovo Serb		Serbia Serb			Serbia Serb IDPs		
1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	69%	1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	65%	1	Kosovo can not leave Serbia
2	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	58%	2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	58%	2	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
3	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	56%	3	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	43%	3	Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
4	Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia	47%	4	Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	43%	4	Not full independence
5	Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	47%	5	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	43%	5	Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law

Points of agreement and disagreement

In contrast to the various points of negotiation or procedural issues listed in question 8 there is little evidence of a Kosovo Albanian and Serb consensus around the guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (table 9 below). But then this is to be expected. Everyone wants negotiations to resolve the problems of Kosovo but everyone would also like any settlement achieved to be on their terms. This is quite natural and it is from this point that negotiations have to start on what are sometimes referred to as the substantive issues.

Perhaps I have been too hard by highlighting everything in grey when a 40% plus level of unacceptable is reached. A simple majority vote only requires 50% plus 1. It should also be remembered that items that are unacceptable on their own are often acceptable as part of a comprehensive agreement or package that has

the potential to deliver peace, security and increased prosperity. For example Protestants strongly opposed police reform in Northern Ireland but accepted it as part of the Belfast Agreement.

With all these points in mind what are the clear points of greatest potential agreement for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs? They are: NATO should stay as long as is needed at 0% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 3% for Kosovo Serbs; more investment to solve the problem of final status quicker at 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but 17% for Serb IDPs; all Balkan states should join NATO at 3% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but 23% for Serbia Serbs; an international economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of a final status agreement at 7% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but only 6% for Serbia Serbs; all of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU at 11% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and less than 4% for all Serbs; no unification with neighbours is almost equally unacceptable to everyone at 16% for Kosovo Albanians, 20% for Kosovo Serbs, 36% for Serbia Serbs and 19% for Serb IDPs; Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship is unacceptable to only 18% of Kosovo Albanians; meet Standards before agreeing final status is only unacceptable to 22% of Kosovo Albanians and a solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law is only unacceptable to 26% of Kosovo Albanians. In all of this there is plenty of substance to form a basis for negotiation and all these points should be borne in mind when examining various constitutional arrangements tested against public opinion in question 10.

Table 9. Points of agreement and disagreement

	Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'. Percent 'Unacceptable'	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia IDPs
1	Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia	0%	51%	48%	54%
2	NATO should stay as long as is needed	0%	3%	23%	21%
3	Full independence	1%	92%	87%	81%
4	Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army	1%	91%	84%	76%
5	More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker	2%	14%	13%	17%
6	Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy	3%	89%	72%	67%
7	All Balkan states should join NATO	3%	15%	23%	11%
8	Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force	4%	67%	52%	59%
9	Kosovo should be a member of the UN	5%	71%	70%	66%
10	International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status agreement	7%	22%	6%	33%
11	Standards can be met at the same time as final status	7%	57%	21%	50%
12	All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU	11%	4%	4%	3%
13	No return to the way things were before the war - 1999	15%	47%	24%	43%
14	No unification with neighbours	16%	20%	36%	19%
15	Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship	18%	9%	6%	16%
16	Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum	18%	86%	79%	71%
17	Meet Standards before agreeing final status	22%	3%	3%	18%
18	Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions	22%	68%	34%	56%
19	Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law	26%	21%	6%	19%
20	Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo	34%	72%	68%	60%
21	No partition	34%	42%	21%	21%
22	Not full integration in Serbia	34%	68%	49%	67%
23	Independence only when agreed conditions are met	38%	61%	66%	61%
24	A practically independent Kosovo without the words 'independent' or 'sovereign'	39%	87%	79%	66%
25	Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia	42%	9%	6%	3%
26	Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes	43%	48%	65%	60%
27	Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions	43%	18%	7%	31%
28	Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes	45%	33%	17%	35%
29	Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo	47%	42%	19%	32%
30	Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia	48%	77%	83%	72%
31	National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	54%	84%	53%	56%
32	National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians	57%	79%	56%	78%

33	Independence after a fixed period of adjustment	57%	71%	71%	66%
34	Economic independence within existing borders with Serbia	62%	41%	39%	47%
35	Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government	64%	73%	81%	76%
36	Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation	64%	68%	59%	59%
37	Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure	67%	11%	14%	36%
38	Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region	68%	62%	41%	61%
39	Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep Kosovo	68%	34%	26%	28%
40	Partition into Serb and Albanian regions	70%	16%	32%	38%
41	Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia	76%	29%	39%	47%
42	Decentralisation by ethnic region	78%	10%	17%	32%
43	Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia	78%	36%	24%	27%
44	A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo Presidents in turn	80%	83%	63%	57%
45	A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro	81%	62%	63%	61%
46	Delay final status for at least ten years	82%	31%	52%	57%
47	Less than independence but more than autonomy	84%	31%	20%	41%
48	Kosovo can not leave Serbia	86%	4%	3%	5%
49	Not full independence	90%	24%	8%	27%

10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo: The Question

With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'.

Points of disagreement

In this question the options on offer were deliberately written and arranged across the full political spectrum from union of all Serbian lands at one extreme to union of all Albanian lands at the other, with a wide selection of various options in between. Inevitably, as all the answers to all the previous questions would indicate, the first preference for different constitutional packages is very different for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Thirty six percent of Kosovo Albanians consider full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo to be essential (table 10.a below). On the other hand 65% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs and 64% of Serb IDPs all consider full integration of Kosovo into Serbia to be essential as their preferred constitutional option (highlighted in grey). There are no real surprises in any of these results but this analysis does not help to solve any problems that will take us beyond what must essentially be seen as the opening negotiating positions of the two communities.

Table 10.a. Points of disagreement

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'. Per cent 'Essential'	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Union of all Serbian lands	1%	28%	24%	27%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	0%	65%	46%	64%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	0%	6%	9%	12%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	0%	3%	7%	8%
A protectorate of the EU	3%	9%	3%	3%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	4%	1%	3%	9%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	0%	6%	4%	6%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	0%	9%	4%	3%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	1%	12%	3%	2%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	4%	5%	3%	2%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	36%	0%	2%	0%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	17%	0%	1%	0%
Union of all Albanian lands	30%	0%	1%	0%

Points of agreement

If we now turn our attention to the levels of ‘unacceptable’ the position radically changes to identify points of possible compromise (table 10.b below). The lowest levels of unacceptable for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs together are for a protectorate of the EU at only 20% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 58% for Kosovo Serbs, 60% for Serbia Serbs and 58% for Serb IDPs (highlighted in grey). The joint ‘popularity’ of this option is followed by two others: a state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo at 63% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians 48% for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 62% for Serb IDPs; and a state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs at 52% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 64% for Kosovo Serbs, 67% for Serbia Serbs and 65% for Serb IDPs (also highlighted in grey).

Other ‘contenders’ might include an Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia but 88% of Kosovo Serbs find this option unacceptable and a state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia is unacceptable to 96% of Kosovo Albanians. Perhaps Kosovo Serbs are split on this particular idea between those who live in the North of Kosovo and those who do not as 57% of them find this proposal unacceptable while only 48% consider the prospect of their own canton unacceptable.

Table 10.b. Points of agreement

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the following options you consider to be ‘Essential’, ‘Desirable’, ‘Acceptable’, ‘Tolerable’ or ‘Unacceptable’. Per cent ‘Unacceptable’	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Union of all Serbian lands	96%	13%	13%	13%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	98%	3%	4%	1%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	96%	66%	40%	35%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	92%	63%	43%	46%
A protectorate of the EU	20%	58%	60%	58%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	34%	88%	68%	66%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	96%	57%	55%	60%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	87%	59%	62%	61%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	63%	48%	65%	62%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	52%	64%	67%	65%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	13%	94%	93%	88%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	10%	98%	96%	97%
Union of all Albanian lands	8%	98%	95%	97%

But the big worry for both the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the international community is will any of these various constitutional arrangements bring about an exodus of Kosovo Albanians or Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo. Additionally is there any chance at all that a significant number of Serb IDPs might return to Kosovo under the right conditions. These possibilities were tested in question 11.

11 Displaced persons: The Question 11.a

For persons living in Kosovo - *And for each of these options would you stay in Kosovo – YES or NO*
 For Serb IDPs in Serbia – *And for each of these options would you return to Kosovo – YES or NO*

Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo

Again the most popular constitutional option for both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs together seems to be a protectorate of the EU with 83% of Kosovo Albanians willing to stay, 45% of Kosovo Serbs willing to stay and 27% of Serb IDPs willing to return. The other options of a state as part of the EU, a choice of citizenship for Serbs with, perhaps, their own canton, also fair quite well. But clearly Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and the international community would like a better result than this. How can this be achieved?

Table 11.a. Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo

Question 11a percent 'Yes' For each of these options would you stay/return in Kosovo?	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
Union of all Serbian lands	9%	91%	69%
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia	8%	97%	86%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)	9%	36%	49%
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and regional status in the EU	14%	39%	38%
A protectorate of the EU	83%	45%	27%
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia	74%	13%	25%
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia	16%	42%	27%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority	24%	42%	25%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo	46%	48%	23%
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs	57%	33%	20%
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo	88%	6%	5%
Union of Kosovo with Albania	92%	3%	0%
Union of all Albanian lands	94%	3%	0%

Question 11.b

And finally: It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination. YES or NO

In search of the best possible solution

In the final question asked in this poll persons living in Kosovo and those who might return there were asked a very idealistic question which did not focus on the constitutional arrangements as such but on security and equality as best understood in terms of human rights. In this context 83% of Kosovo Albanians said they would stay along with 71% of Kosovo Serbs and 61% of Serb IDPs would return (see table 11.b below).

Table 11.b. Ideal conditions to stay in/return to Kosovo

Question 11.b percent 'Yes'	Kosovo Albanian	Kosovo Serb	Serbia Serb IDPs
It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination.	83%	71%	61%

Conclusion

As all the questions on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs would indicate, along with all the questions on matters of security, this ideal solution is at best an aspiration that could be strived for. It is a dream that would take at least a lifetime to achieve if ever. But what can be achieved is real progress towards this ideal in terms of social and political reform in combination with suitable constitutional arrangements that will go as far as such arrangements can to ensure security for all. By bringing together the most workable elements of all the questions reviewed in the second half of this report this can be done and this must be the objective of the negotiations ahead. Implementation, however, will take time. Fortunately both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs welcome the involvement of the international community, particularly the EU, whose influence in the region is clearly on the rise.



Mission to Serbia and Montenegro



ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE



Stabilitätsbündnis für Südosteuropa
Gefördert durch Deutschland
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
Sponsored by Germany



United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



The Albanian Serb Information Exchange Forum was made possible through support provided by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the German Government via the Stability Pact, the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (IFA), International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNESCO, and the Kosovo Mission of the US Agency for International Development (under the terms of award No. 167-A-00-01-00107-00). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisers or of the donors listed above.